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UNWRITTEN RULES AND THE NEW 
CONTRACT PARADIGM 
David Skeel* 
The emergence of large-scale corporate reorganization in the second half of 
the nineteenth century was the single most remarkable achievement of the 
common law in America. When a large railroad failed, as they often did, 
everyone wanted it to be reorganized.1 All of the stakeholders would be worse 
off if the railroad was liquidated, even the senior creditors, since a mortgage on, 
say, a hundred miles of railroad track in the middle of nowhere was worth little 
if the railroad was shut down. The public interest also cried out for 
reorganization, given the growing nation’s need for an effective system of 
transportation. Unfortunately, serious constitutional obstacles made it difficult 
for either Congress or the states to intervene. The courts filled the gap by giving 
their imprimatur to a remarkable innovation that became known as equity or 
railroad receivership. Creditors asked for a receiver and pretended to foreclose 
on the railroad’s assets, but the parties actually reorganized the railroad through 
a “sale” that effected a restructuring of its obligations. 
In the standard historical account, corporate reorganization evolved from 
this cobbled together, fast-and-loose process to a more formal, structured 
judicial proceeding. After decades of equity receivership practice, the story goes, 
Congress finally codified large scale corporate reorganization in the early 
1930s.2 Congress adopted sweeping reforms in 1938 and again in 1978, when 
current chapter 11 was put in place.3 We now have an elaborate statute 
governing the reorganization of large troubled corporations. 
In this Essay and the larger book from which it comes, Douglas Baird 
contends that the standard account misses an essential feature of corporate 
reorganization practice.4 Corporate reorganization continues to take place 
through negotiations between the debtor and its creditors, just as it did over a 
 
 * S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Douglas Baird, 
Sarah Borders, Richard Levin, and Bruce Markell for helpful comments and conversation, and to the editors of 
the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal for including me in this fine symposium. 
 1 With apologies for immediately succumbing to the commenter’s temptation to veer into self-reference, 
the events in this paragraph are described in detail in DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001). 
 2 Id. at 16. 
 3 Id. at 19. 
 4 Douglas G. Baird, The Fraudulent Conveyance Origins of Chapter 11: An Essay on the Unwritten Law 
of Corporate Reorganizations, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 693 (2020); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE UNWRITTEN 
LAW OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (unpublished manuscript, 2020). 
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century ago. These negotiations are governed by unwritten rules that “are well-
known to insiders, but largely invisible to those on the outside.”5 The parties are 
expected to provide full disclosure, and to give robust participation rights to 
every affected party. Senior creditors can use modest payoffs to quiet potential 
objectors, but “other sorts of side deals are out of bounds.”6 The role of the judge 
is to serve as a vigilant referee, intervening if one of the players violates these 
unwritten rules.7  
According to Professor Baird, the unwritten rules date back to the 
prohibition of actions that “hinder, delay, or defraud” in the statute of 13 
Elizabeth nearly five hundred years ago.8 Some of the unwritten rules, such as 
the insistence on full disclosure, have remained constant through time. In other 
respects, they have evolved. The unwritten rules, not bankruptcy’s distribution 
rules or other features of the Bankruptcy Code (Code), are the essence of 
corporate reorganization. My colleague Charles Mooney once insisted that 
bankruptcy law is simply Civil Procedure.9 For Professor Baird, bankruptcy’s 
essence is fraudulent conveyance. 
Professor Baird’s story is highly persuasive, in my view, and captures a key 
dimension of bankruptcy practice that has not been fully appreciated. Even when 
Professor Baird is covering familiar ground, such as the emergence of equity 
receivership, he supplies new and interesting insights. Writing about early 
railroad receivership cases in which creditors of a subsidiary were given no 
recovery, for instance, Professor Baird discerns a logic to their exclusion: “the 
only ones given a seat at the bargaining table were those stakeholders who were 
to be part of the business going forward.”10 “[T]hose who had invested in the 
assets of the railroad that were to stay with the business” needed to be included, 
and to be given a recovery.11 Others did not. 
The story covers a great deal of ground very quickly, and as a result 
 
 5 Baird, Origins, supra note 4, at 693. 
 6 Id. 
 7 “Rather than a dispenser of Solomonic wisdom, the bankruptcy judge is like a referee. A good referee 
ensures that the rules of the game are followed.” Id. It is heartening that Professor Baird can unselfconsciously 
describe bankruptcy judges as “referees.” Even a decade or two ago, the memory of the inferior status of 
“bankruptcy referees” under the old Bankruptcy Act was still fresh, and scholars would have avoided the referee 
metaphor. 
 8 Id. at 693. In his comments on Professor Baird’s essay, Professor Markell argues for much earlier 
origins. Bruce A. Markell, Lawyers, Judges and Unwritten Rules, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 713 (2020). 
 9 Charles Mooney, A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (is) Civil Procedure, 61 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004). 
 10 Baird, Origins, supra note 4, at 700. 
 11 Id.  
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oversimplifies at times. The historical evolution also is bumpier than Professor 
Baird suggests. Rather than simply introducing more vigilant judicial oversight 
of the restructuring process,12 for instance, the New Deal reformers seem to me 
to have sought and temporarily achieved a sharp break from prior practice. But 
the persistence of a handful of evolving implicit principles over many 
generations is remarkable, and quite revealing of how large-scale corporate 
reorganization actually works.13 This project is the crowning achievement (so 
far, at least!) of the most important bankruptcy scholar of our time. 
In the discussion that follows, I make two simple points. In the first part, I 
argue that what’s good for bankruptcy insiders is not always good for everyone; 
in the second and third, that bankruptcy’s written rules—by which I mean both 
statutory provisions and the parties’ contracts—still matter, and they matter a 
lot. 
I. THE DANGERS OF UNWRITTEN RULES 
Professor Baird tells a (mostly) happy story about insolvency lawyers 
devising pragmatic solutions to financial distress under the benign but alert eye 
of judges who leave the parties to their own devices so long as they honor the 
unwritten rules. Although Professor Baird does not fully delineate them—
perhaps because doing so would lift the lid on their mystery—the unwritten rules 
seem to include an expectation of full disclosure, a commitment to ensuring that 
everyone gets to participate, and an acceptance of “tips” but not bribes.  
The foil in Professor Baird’s story is bankruptcy’s distributional rules, 
especially the absolute priority rule. The absolute priority rule is extolled by 
many as the essence of corporate reorganization. This view is mistaken in two 
respects, in Professor Baird’s view. Not only does the conventional wisdom 
exaggerate the import of the distributional rules, but absolute priority is not even 
the best baseline. The first of these contentions is central here, and the second is 
developed in detail in Professor Baird’s other work.14 
 
 12 “The judge had to apply the principles of the Statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5 more aggressively, insist on full 
disclosure, and be quick to act if the potential for advantage-taking arose.” Id. at 705. 
 13 Or, we might say, how reorganization and sales work. With respect to current chapter 11 cases, 
Professor Baird’s discussion often seems more relevant to filings that lead to bankruptcy sales than to traditional 
reorganizations. 
 14 Professor Baird’s doubts about absolute priority seem to have emerged in articles such as Douglas G. 
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921 (2001). His work has spawned a major debate on the priority question. 
Compare Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of Bankruptcy, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2017); Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option Preservation: Priority in 
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While bankruptcy’s unwritten rules are attractive in many respects, it is 
important to acknowledge the potential dangers of a non-transparent, insider-run 
system. In the early decades of the last century, the New Deal reformers thought 
that insiders’ temptation to favor their own interests poisoned the entire 
reorganization process.15 William Douglas famously condemned the 
“degeneration of the bar” in many reorganizations, and complained that 
“[c]onflicts of interest have had their corroding influence.”16 The voluminous 
report produced by the Securities and Exchange Commission under Douglas’s 
guidance in the late 1930s repeatedly condemned the reorganization insiders 
who operated according to their own unwritten rules.17 
The New Dealers’ complaints were seasoned with hyperbole, in my view, 
but the temptation for insiders to favor their own interests, whether consciously 
or unconsciously, is real. The most obvious example is the fees charged by 
lawyers and bankers in large cases.18 Because the leading players are repeat 
players, and will continue to work with one another in future cases, they have 
little incentive to police one another’s compensation.19 The principal current 
corrective in recent cases has been to appoint a fee examiner,20 but even the most 
savvy fee examiner is only a limited substitute for policing by the parties who 
are most intimately involved in the case.  
 
Chapter 11; 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (2011); Anthony J. Casey & Edward R. Morrison, Beyond Options (working 
paper); with Barry A. Adler and George Triantis, Debt Priority and Options in Bankruptcy: A Policy 
Intervention, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 583 (2017) (defending absolute priority). 
 15 Although my focus here is on large scale reorganization, bankruptcy cases involving smaller firms 
were thought to be controlled by “bankruptcy rings” for much of the twentieth century. A principal objective of 
the 1978 Code was to curb these abuses. 
 16 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 233 (James Allen ed., 1940). 
 17 “Managements and bankers seek perpetuation of [their] control for the business patronage it commands 
. . . .” the initial volume of the report contended. I SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT ON THE 
STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND 
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 863 (1937). Reorganization lawyers were no better: “The vice of the bar is that 
the bar has been charging all that the traffic will bear.” Id. at 867.  
 18 Whether the fees are excessive is the subject of a longstanding debate. Compare LYNN M. LOPUCKI & 
JOSEPH DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES: DATES, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 
(2011) (contending that professional fees are excessive), with Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & 
Professional Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77 (2008) (more sanguine view of fees). Either way, they are enormous 
in many big cases, see Katy Stech Ferek, Fed Says Lehman Brothers Chapter 11 Case is Costliest in History, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2019) (discussing Federal Reserve projection that the fees and expenses in the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy will reach nearly $6 billion). 
 19 Fee examiners mitigate this problem to some extent, but imperfectly. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, 
What We “Know” About Chapter 11 Cost is Wrong, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1 (2012). 
 20 Another of the commentators on Professor Baird’s essay, Professor Markell, is the fee examiner in the 
PG&E bankruptcy. See, e.g., Alex Wolf, PG&E Professionals, Examiner at Odds Over Non-Work Travel Fees, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 25, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/pg-e-professionals-
examiner-at-odds-over-non-work-travel-fees. 
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A more subtle version of the temptation to favor insiders is the tendency of 
bankruptcy professionals, and even bankruptcy judges, to privilege bankruptcy 
over alternative forums for resolving financial distress. This bias is one possible 
explanation for bankruptcy judges’ more favorable response to restructuring 
support agreements (RSAs) and other contracts entered into during bankruptcy, 
than to intercreditor agreements that predate the bankruptcy filing. RSAs are 
drafted by bankruptcy professionals and increase the likelihood of a successful 
reorganization; intercreditor agreements are not and often do not.21 To be sure, 
the preference for bankruptcy is not always undesirable. For instance, contracts 
made before bankruptcy sometimes have problematic features. However, 
bankruptcy courts appear to be excessively hostile to prebankruptcy contracts.22 
A process that depends on negotiations among insiders also may also 
produce significantly suboptimal results. Professor Baird notes that “[w]hile 
there [are] many possible deals” in this environment, “the players naturally 
gravitate[] toward only a few”—a limited number of “focal points.”23 This can 
be beneficial if the focal points are likely to effectively resolve the debtor’s 
financial distress. But what if the focal points are more problematic? If the focal 
points are major creditors’ current claims, for instance, the restructuring may not 
be sufficiently robust, and the debtor may still have too much debt when it 
emerges from bankruptcy. This may have been a problem with railroad 
reorganizations a century ago,24 and it could still be a problem in large-scale 
corporate reorganizations today.25 
I do not think the dark sides of a process governed by unwritten rules are so 
dire that bankruptcy law needs to be completely upended. But I do think it is 
important to look for opportunities to diminish the distortions that attend a 
system run by insiders.26 
 
 21 Bankruptcy insiders also can be expected to lobby for expansions of bankruptcy, and to resist other 
incursions on their territory, such as efforts by the parties to waive bankruptcy.  
 22 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 NW. 
U. L. REV. 255, 257–58 (2017) (criticizing courts’ use of a “clear beyond peradventure” standard in policing 
intercreditor agreements). 
 23 Baird, Origins, supra note 5, at 710 n.83. (citing THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 
57–58 (1960)). 
 24 See Stephen Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
1420, 1449 (2004). 
 25 Mark Roe made this argument decades ago. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for 
Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983). 
 26 In response to somewhat analogous concerns in corporate law—plaintiffs’ lawyers challenges to nearly 
every large proposed merger—Delaware has cracked down on disclosure-only settlements. See In re Trulia, Inc. 
Stockholder Litigation, 129 A.3d 884, 898–99 (Del. Ch. 2016) (requiring proponents of a disclosure-only 
settlement to show the disclosures are “plainly material”). 
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II. THE WRITTEN RULES MATTER 
The great insight of Professor Baird’s essay is demonstrating just how much 
a simple set of unwritten principles matter, and tracing them back to early 
fraudulent conveyance law. These principles are indeed central—much more 
central than anyone realized before Professor Baird’s work-- but it is important 
to recognize just how much the written rules still matter.27 
Fraudulent conveyance law itself nicely makes this point. Professor Baird 
focuses on the early emergence of fraudulent conveyance law, which prohibited 
intentional misbehavior by debtors and came to rely on a loose set of “badges of 
fraud.”28 In its traditional garb, fraudulent conveyance law depends more on 
standards than on rules. But it has become increasingly rules oriented, thanks to 
the widespread adoption of “constructive fraud” statutes in the early twentieth 
century. If an insolvent debtor transfers property for less than reasonably 
equivalent consideration, the transfer can be avoided.29 Although “constructive 
fraud” is something of an oxymoron, as Charles Tabb has aptly pointed out,30 it 
now figures far prominently than the traditional, “actual” fraud provisions, in no 
small part because it is rule-oriented and easy to apply.31 To be sure, discretion 
comes into play at times even with constructive fraud, but its use is rarely 
determined by the “unwritten rules.” 
Bankruptcy’s distributional rules also seem more consequential than 
Professor Baird’s story allows. Under the flexible version of absolute priority in 
current law, the rules serve as a backstop to the parties’ efforts to negotiate a 
restructuring. A class of creditors can agree to treatment that violates the 
absolute priority rule.32 If the class votes no, however, the proposed plan cannot 
be confirmed if it deviates from the absolute priority rule with respect to that 
class.33  
 
 27 Richard Levin also emphasizes the importance of the written rules in his commentary—an especially 
appropriate perspective given that he was one of the principal drafters of the Bankruptcy Code. Richard Levin, 
A Response to Professor Baird’s Essay on Unwritten Law, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 723 (2020). 
 28 “Twyne’s Case held that, in addition to transactions involving actual fraud, the Statute of 13 Eliz. 
empowered the court to strike down any transactions that had ‘badges of fraud.’” Baird, Origins, supra note 4, 
at 694. 
 29 Professor Baird hints at this feature of modern fraudulent conveyance law, but it does not figure in the 
unwritten rules. Id.  
 30 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 591–92 (2d ed. 2009). 
 31 Preference law is now similarly rule-oriented, as Professor Baird notes. Baird, Origins, supra note 5, 
at 696 n.21 (citing Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of Voidable 
Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 4–5 (1986)). 
 32 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2019). 
 33 See § 1129(b). 
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Professor Baird does acknowledge that the distributional rules perform a 
useful function by forcing the debtor to give every major class a seat at the 
bargaining table. Professor Baird suggests that this, rather than the rules 
themselves, is the principal contribution of priority. “Protecting the bargaining 
environment rather than ensuring proper division of the assets is the task at 
hand[,]” he writes.34 “Ensuring that distributional rules are followed is necessary 
to do this and hence a necessary part of ensuring that the players follow the rules 
of the game, but it is hardly the only part.”35 
The seat-at-the-table benefit of the priority rules does seem essential, but the 
priority rules strike me as doing more than this alone. In my view, the absolute 
priority rule provides an essential baseline for the bankruptcy process.36 One of 
the difficulties of the unwritten rule that modest payments to potential dissenters 
are okay but side payments and bribes are not is that it is extraordinarily difficult 
to tell which is which. In its much-discussed Jevic decision, the Supreme Court, 
perhaps in part for this reason, adopted a per se prohibition against payments 
that bypass a higher priority class in the context of a so-called structured 
dismissal.37 The absolute priority rule does not just force the debtor and senior 
creditors to permit the intervening party to participate; it prohibits them from 
implementing a plan—no matter how compelling the plan may seem—that does 
not honor the intervening party’s priority rights. 
One context where the unwritten tip-versus-bribe rule does still operate is 
when a senior creditor that may have a claim to all of the debtor’s assets purports 
to redirect some of its recovery to a lower priority class. In an asset sale, this 
takes the form of a “tip” to the creditors committee. In a traditional 
reorganization, it takes the form of a “gift” from senior creditors to one class of 
lower priority class of claims but not others. Whereas courts have often allowed 
tips in the sale context, with traditional reorganizations, the principal focus of 
Professor Baird’s essay, courts (especially appellate courts) have been quite 
hostile, often insisting on adherence to bankruptcy’s written rules.38 It is possible 
that one reason tips are more prevalent than gifts is that it is nearly impossible 
for an objecting creditor to challenge an asset sale that has been negotiated by 
insiders and approved by the bankruptcy judge, due to a strong statutory 
 
 34 Baird, Origins, supra note 4, at 709.  
 35 Id. 
 36 It is also worth noting that the choice of priority rule can significantly affect the parties’ incentives and 
the bargaining dynamics.  
 37 See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986–87 (2017). 
 38 See, e.g., Dish Network Corp. v. DBSB N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 98, 100 
(2d Cir. 2011); In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512–13 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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presumption that sales will not be undone.39 This may be a context where the 
written rules have the ironic effect of protecting decisions made in accordance 
with the unwritten rules.40 
III. THE NEW CONTRACT PARADIGM 
The place where Professor Baird’s emphasis on unwritten rules and the 
continuing importance of written rules most fully come together is contract. The 
most dramatic development in recent reorganization practice is the extent to 
which reorganization cases are now shaped by pre-bankruptcy (ex-ante) 
contracts, and by contracts negotiated during the bankruptcy case (ex-post). 
Elsewhere, George Triantis and I have called this the new “contract paradigm.”41  
Contracts have always been central to large scale reorganization, of course. 
In a railroad receivership, investors “deposited” their securities with the 
committee negotiating on their behalf pursuant to a contract, and the committees 
joined together to form a reorganization committee pursuant to another 
contract.42 But the scope of contract has dramatically expanded with respect to 
both prebankruptcy contracting and contracting during the bankruptcy case. 
Start with prebankruptcy contracting. Financial contracting is far more 
sophisticated today than in earlier generations, which has dramatically expanded 
the range of potential prebankruptcy contracts. It is now possible to divvy up 
cash flows in ways that would have been unimaginable in the past, and to 
allocate responsibility in the event of financial distress. The new contracts 
include intercreditor agreements and unitranche arrangements, in addition to 
more traditional loan syndicates.43  
 
 39 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2019) (good faith sale cannot be reversed unless it is stayed pending appeal). 
It also is difficult to appeal bankruptcy judges’ orders confirming a reorganization plan, due to equitable 
mootness doctrine. But equitable mootness is not as complete a barrier to challenge as § 363(m). 
 40 There is a more general point here as well: the unwritten rules benefit from the difficulty of appealing 
decisions made at the bankruptcy court level. If existing constraints on appeal such as equitable mootness 
doctrine are relaxed, the unwritten rules could have less sway, at least on the margins. For criticism of current 
equitable mootness doctrine, see Bruce Markell, The Needs of the Many: Equitable Mootness’ Pernicious 
Effects, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 377 (2019). 
 41 David A. Skeel & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm, 166 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1777, 1780 (2018). 
 42 “Various committees, generally organized by the management or underwriters of the securities, sprang 
up,” as one mid-twentieth century commentator put it. “These committees without court supervision drew their 
own deposit agreements, solicited the deposit of securities and formulated plans of reorganization by negotiation 
and agreement among the various classes of security holders.” Arthur H. Dean, Corporate Reorganization, 26 
CORNELL L. Q. 537, 538 (1941). 
 43 For an analysis of intercreditor agreements and proposals for policing them, see Skeel, et al., 
Bankruptcy on the Side, supra note 22, at 258, 261. 
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Post-petition contracting also figures much more prominently than in the 
past. This is in part due to several underappreciated features of the 1978 Code 
itself. Unlike the earlier Bankruptcy Act, which constrained the scope of ex post 
contracting, the Code encourages the parties to renegotiate their entitlements 
through features such as the voting rules, which make the terms of a restructuring 
binding if the specified majority of a class approves, and the ability to wave off 
the absolute priority rule for any class that approves.44  
Current bankruptcy law also has a second distinctive feature in this regard: 
it converts many stakeholders who did not have prebankruptcy contracts with 
the debtor into what are, in effect, contract creditors.45 Tort victims, for instance, 
are given unsecured claims, which can be renegotiated in the same fashion as 
prebankruptcy contracts. Under prior bankruptcy law, many of these claims 
would not have been “provable,” and as a result would not have been part of the 
bankruptcy case.46 Nearly every pre-petition obligation against the debtor 
becomes a contract claim in bankruptcy. 
More recently, another form of ex-post contracting has emerged. The parties 
in most large-scale reorganizations now enter into restructuring support 
agreements (RSAs) or plan support agreements (PSAs).47 (Although the terms 
are sometimes used interchangeably, agreements negotiated prior to the 
bankruptcy filing are usually called RSAs and those that first emerge during the 
bankruptcy case PSAs). RSAs and PSAs are designed to bind the signatories to 
the terms of an anticipated reorganization plan. This can be particularly 
important if the debtor’s claims are actively traded. In addition to imposing 
deadlines for confirmation of a reorganization plan and other key steps in the 
bankruptcy process, these contracts require each signatory to ensure that any 
purchaser of its claims will also be bound.48 
Much more than the new ex-ante contracts, the new ex-post bankruptcy 
contracts are subject to the unwritten rules Professor Baird has identified. RSAs 
and PSAs often include fees that are designed to compensate signatories for their 
 
 44 See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 41, at 1799–800. 
 45 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2019) (defining “claim” expansively, as any “right to payment, whether or not 
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured . . . .”). 
 46 See, e.g., Stephen Allen Edwards, Note, Tort Claims Under the Present and Proposed Bankruptcy Acts, 
11 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 418–24 (1978) (discussing the limits of “provability” for tort claims). 
 47 See, e.g., Edward Janger & Adam J. Levitin, Badges of Opportunism: Principles for Policing 
Restructuring Support Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 169 (2019); Douglas G. Baird, 
Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593 (2017).  
 48 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2020). 
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role in negotiating a potential plan and to induce other signatories to sign.49 The 
terms of the fees seem to reflect the leading bankruptcy professionals’ 
understanding of the line between acceptable fees and illegitimate vote buying. 
There are points of friction between both (ex-ante) intercreditor agreements 
and (ex-post) RSAs, on the one hand, and key provisions of the Code, on the 
other. Some intercreditor agreements appear to interfere with bankruptcy’s 
voting rules, for instance, by assigning junior lienholders’ voting rights to the 
senior lienholders or forbidding junior lienholders from challenging a plan 
supported by the seniors.50 By committing signatories to vote in favor of an 
anticipated plan, RSAs and PSAs seem to violate the requirement that a 
disclosure statement be distributed before the debtor solicits votes.51 Despite the 
similarity of the frictions, bankruptcy judges have been much more deferential 
to RSAs and other ex-post agreements than to ex-ante agreements. As noted 
earlier, this may in part be because ex-post agreements are negotiated by other 
bankruptcy insiders, in accordance with the insiders’ code of context.52 In my 
view, courts have been too hostile to ex-ante agreements and at times too 
deferential to ex-post agreements, with potentially detrimental effects for the 
efficiency of the large-scale reorganization process.53  
The Eighth Circuit’s recent Peabody Energy case is a good illustration.54 A 
central issue when Peabody Coal filed for bankruptcy was a dispute over the 
scope of the senior lenders’ liens. At the request of the debtor, the issue was 
submitted to mediation. Creditors who wished to participate in the mediation 
were required to refrain from claims trading during the process. Rather than 
simply resolving the lien dispute, the mediation led to a proposed reorganization 
plan. The principal participants in the mediation would have an exclusive right 
to participate in 22.5% of a private placement of preferred stock at a price 35% 
below the stock’s expected value.55 Any creditor could participate in the other 
two slices of the placement, but only if they signed a PSA reflecting the terms 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Bank of Am. v. N. LaSalle St. Ltd. P’ship (In re 203 N. Lasalle St. P’ship.), 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2000) (contractual provision assigning junior creditors’ votes to senior creditors). 
 51 See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2019). 
 52 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 53 Skeel & Triantis, supra note 41, at 1817. This does not mean there is no need to police intercreditor 
agreements and other ex-ante contracts. There is. Courts should be mindful, for instance, of potential externality 
effects on other creditors. Skeel, et al., Bankruptcy on the Side, supra note 22. But this does not require courts 
to ignore the contracts altogether or interpret them in highly uncharitable fashion. 
 54 Ad Hoc Comm. of Non-Consenting Creditors v. Peabody Energy Corp. (In re Peabody Energy Corp.), 
933 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2019). For a more extensive discussion of the case, see Skeel, Distorted Choice, supra 
note 48. 
 55 In re Peabody Energy Corp., 933 F.3d at 922.  
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of the proposed plan within 3 days for the second (5%) slice and within 30 days 
for the third (72.5%) slice.56 
Although the terms of the private placement were deeply problematic, it was 
approved by the courts. The arrangement could perhaps be critiqued under 
bankruptcy’s unwritten rules. If the entrance requirements for participating in 
the mediation were too onerous, the reasoning might go, the unwritten rule 
guaranteeing everyone a “seat at the table” was violated and the private 
placement should have been disallowed.57 But this approach seems quite 
indirect. The real question is not whether everyone had an opportunity to 
participate; it is whether the contract should be enforceable as written, or 
whether its terms are problematic. This is the approach courts apply in corporate 
law and it seems to me the approach courts should apply here.58 The more 
general point is that, while bankruptcy’s unwritten rules are important, the 
central issue in current reorganization practice is managing the tradeoffs 
between ex-ante and ex-post contracting. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay is the latest in a long line of path-breaking Douglas Baird 
writings. He has discovered a feature of the evolution of large-scale organization 
that other scholars were vaguely aware of, but whose importance no one had 
fully recognized. In this commentary, I have simply endeavored to put Professor 
Baird’s insights into a larger context, by offering reminders that an insider-
oriented system has downsides as well as benefits, and that the written law of 
bankruptcy still matters a great deal. 
 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 As Professor Baird posited in an email discussion among the participants on the panel for which this 
commentary was written. Email from Douglas G. Baird, Professor, The University of Chicago Law School, to 
author (Feb. 17, 2020, 4:46 p.m.) (on file with author). In my view, the requirement that mediation participants 
refrain from trading should not be viewed as an excessively onerous obligation, but I acknowledge this is 
debatable. 
 58 In Paramount Commc’ns., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 828 (Del. 1993), for instance, the 
Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a lockup agreement, deeming its terms excessively generous to the bidder 
and likely to interfere with alternative bids for the target corporation. 
